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Introduction
There has been great interest in examining the changes in the structure and dispersion of wages brought about by the transition to market economies in the countries of Central and East Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
1 Similar interest has arisen with respect to the traditional developing economies as they carried out major privatization, liberalization and other market-oriented reforms over the last two decades. The introduction of market forces was expected to change the structure of wages and the composition of production across economic sectors. 2 It was not clear, however, how these changes would affect the relative wage inequality of men and women. Would changes in the demand for labor resulting from market forces and the introduction of private ownership result in compositional changes that would increase or decrease women's inequality more than men's? Would the introduction of more flexibility in the labor market (e.g. allowing unemployment and part-time work) and concurrent shifts in labor supply result in more or less wage inequality? Would changes in institutions, such as the minimum wage, affect wage dispersion, and would they affect it differently for men than for women?
Recent methodological advances, namely the development of the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lemieux (2002) decomposition techniques, present new opportunities for answering the above questions. In this paper, we provide the first application of the Lemieux (2002) decomposition in the context of the developing and transition economies. We examine changes in the distribution of wages for men and women in Ukraine, which with a population of 47 million, is the second largest country in the former Soviet bloc and is comparable in population size to Poland and South Africa. Until recently, there has been little global attention given to Ukraine, but the events of the Orange Revolution in late 2004 have put the country on 1 See for example, Keane and Prasad (2002) , Münich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005a) , Newell (2001) , Newell and Socha (2005) for studies of changes in the wage structure in the transition countries and Milanovic (1999) and Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) for studies of changes in inequality in these economies. 2 In the CEE and FSU countries, the highly compressed wage grids with relatively low returns to higher education under communism led to the expectation that the wage structure would become more dispersed as returns to human capital rose and more skilled individuals took advantage of new opportunities.
-3 -center stage of the East-West political theater. The citizenry has shown a desire to break away from Russia and create an independent democratic state with a market-oriented economy.
Western nations are clearly interested in helping the country succeed in these goals. Failure could have negative repercussions for the European Union and the United States if Ukraine turns more toward the East and becomes entrenched in corruption and "crony capitalism." A key factor in enabling the Orange Revolution government to maintain voter support to continue reforms is increasing wage levels and keeping the distribution of income within an acceptable range.
3
In carrying out our analysis, we examine whether Ukraine's experience with changes in inequality is similar to that of Russia or whether it is closer in this respect to the CEE models of transition. There is substantial evidence that over the transition period Russia experienced larger declines in real wages and higher rates of growth in wage inequality in comparison to the countries of CEE. 4 The CEE governments were more likely than those in FSU to use policies that limit the negative forces of the market on vulnerable individuals' incomes. For example, Boeri and Terrell (2002) highlight the much larger share of government expenditures on social safety nets and higher unemployment benefits in the CEE countries as compared to the FSU. 5 In this paper we will examine a key incomes policy -the minimum wage -which has received less attention in the literature on wages and inequality in the transition economies, but has been deemed important in the US. Minimum wage laws are generally believed to have little or no effect in the FSU countries, where minimum wages have been allowed to erode with inflation to 3 The view that short-term negative distributional consequences can stall economic reform has been in the literature for a while (see e.g., Przeworski, 1991) . Recently Kim and Pirttila (2003) have strong evidence to show that public support for reform is negatively correlated with increases in income inequality and positively correlated with economic stability. They use Eurobarometer survey data from post-communist countries from 1990 to 1997 and take into account endogeneity of support for reform and the progress of reform in the econometrics. 4 See Boeri and Terrell (2002) for a description of this pattern. 5 Garner and Terrell (1998) show how changes in policies -i.e., targeting welfare benefits and indexing pensions --in the Czech Republic kept household income inequality from growing significantly in the first years of the transition while a similar study by Commander et al. (1999) show that the lack of indexing of pension benefits contributed significantly to the widening of household income inequality in Russia.
-4 -miniscule levels, but their effect is expected to be greater in CEE countries. 6 Interestingly, Ukraine raised its minimum wage substantially in the late 1990s and one could possibly observe a significant effect on wage inequality.
Lack of good micro data has prevented research on many important economic questions in Ukraine. We are among the first papers to use new household data from the 2003 Ukrainian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS), with current (2003) and retrospective (1986) information on over 8,500 individuals. We use these data to answer the following questions: a)
To what extent did men's and women's wage inequality rise? b) How much of the rise in inequality is due to changes in the composition of the labor force v. changes in the structure of wages (returns to human capital and job characteristics) brought about by the transition to a market economy? c) To what extent did minimum wages play a role in upholding wages and lowering inequality in Ukraine's transition? For each of these questions we are interested in the changes from the planned economy period (1986) to a period when markets were wellestablished and the government had introduced numerous reforms in its institutions (2003) .
The paper is structured as follows: the salient features of Ukraine's policies in the transition are highlighted in Section 2. A description of the data is found in Section 3. Section 4
shows the extent to which inequality rose for men and women and the role of minimum wages in these changes over time. The counterfactual and decomposition analysis is found in Section 5.
Section 6 identifies which changes in the composition of the labor forces (covariates) and in the returns to human capital and job characteristics (coefficients) were most important. Section 7 concludes.
Macroeconomic and Institutional Context
At the time of our first observation, 1986, Ukraine's economy was characterized by many of the same features found in other countries of the FSU and CEE. It was largely based on heavy -5 -industry and agriculture; agriculture accounted for almost 25 percent of the total labor force, and 39 percent of the industrial labor force consisted of military-industry (EIU, 1994) . As in other Soviet Republics, there was no official unemployment and wages were determined by a centralized tariff or wage grid, leaving little room for employers to determine compensation. 7 As this was the first year of perestroika, some of the rigidity of the wage system was loosened while Gorbachev tried to spur growth by decentralizing parts of the economy. But wage reforms were introduced only in the non-service sector and the reform was limited: enterprises were required to finance wage increases that were still centrally-mandated (Chapman, 1991) .
After Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 it began a gradual transition to a market economy, rather than the "shock therapy" approach taken in many other countries in the region. For example, price liberalization began in 1992 but it was not completed until 1995. The privatization process was initiated in 1992 and it was still not completed by There were a number of wage reforms between 1991 and 2003. The first reform (in the Law on Enterprises of April 1991) abolished the centralized system of wage determination and gave enterprises autonomy to determine wage levels and payment systems. However, they were required (according to Article 19) to use the tariff system as a benchmark to ensure wage differentials between workers according to profession, skill, complexity and conditions of work.
In May 1995 a new Law on Wages was adopted, which strengthened the role of bargaining in setting wages and salaries (ILO, 1998) and by 2003 there was a fairly well established market based system for determining wages. 7 The centralized tariff system consisted of wage coefficients by grade that took into account experience, education, and working conditions. See Münich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005b) for a description of the Communist wage grids in Czechoslovakia.
-6 -Minimum wage legislation existed throughout the period of our study. In a 1976 law, the official minimum wage in the Soviet Union was set at 70 rubles per month. The eleventh FiveYear Plan (covering 1981 -1985 gradually raised the minimum wage to 80 rubles per month by 1985, which is the minimum wage we use at the first date of our analysis. The first Ukrainian minimum wage was established in the 1992 Decree on Wages. It was set according to the price of a basket of goods needed for subsistence, along with "the political discretion to set a higher rate that acted as the floor to wages paid to the lowest occupational grade in any enterprise" (World Bank, 1996) . In 1992 the minimum wage was revalued several times due to hyperinflation; however, from 1993 to early 1996, its nominal level remained constant (at 60,000 karbovanets a month). In 2003 it was set at 185 hryvnas a month (approximately $34.69)
As seen in Figure 1 , the minimum wage fell significantly relative to the average wage from 1989, when it was over 30 percent of the average wage, until 1994, when it was less than 5 percent. After this it rose each year and by 2003 it amounted to about 40 percent of the average wage. (Clearly, the measured effect of the minimum wage on salaries and wage inequality in Ukraine would vary significantly depending on which years were selected for the analysis.)
As with most of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine has had a difficult transition process. As Figure 1 shows, GDP declined dramatically at annual rates as high as 20 percent until the mid-1990s, and inflation reached over 10,000 percent during 1992. Real wages were halved in this year. Independent Ukraine experienced economic growth for the first time in 2000. Despite the declines in GDP and hyperinflation, employment in Ukraine decreased very little, a pattern seen in other FSU countries. 8 Although the official registered unemployment rates as reported by the National Bank of Ukraine remained very low, at less than 1 percent until 1996, the ILO estimates are higher, at over 12 percent in the 1999 and 2000. Partial unemployment (forced leaves and shorter working hours), and informal activity has been common, and many Ukrainians have also begun migrating to gain work abroad.
8 See Boeri and Terrell (2002) .
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Data
The data source is the first wave of the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey have recall lapse when they have an important event as a reference point. Moreover, since wages set in the communist grid were clearly defined and did not change much over time, we expect them to be more easily remembered.
10
The wage data are taken from a ULMS question on "net contractual monthly salary" for a main job in December 1986 and 2003. 11 We rescale the wages for each year so that the mean log wage is zero. Similar to Russia, Ukraine had a significant problem with wage arrears. However by the time of our survey, lack of payment of wages was less frequent than it had been earlier:
10.4 percent of the workers in our sample reported having wage arrears in 2003. This share was higher for men (12.1) than for women (8.8). Nevertheless, by using data from the "net contractual monthly salary," the problem of wage arrears does not affect our analysis of inequality.
12
Finally, we only analyze the data of individuals with non-zero monthly salary data. We do not adjust the salary data for hours worked per month since we include only full-time workers. If individuals reported a wage of zero or did not provide salary data, they are not 10 We also note that since we use the self-reported wage as a dependent variable rather than as a regressor, we avoid the usual problem of "errors in variables" with respect to the right hand side variables. 11 Net contractual salary does not include taxes and it also does not include in-kind payments, arrears, etc. We are not excluding much information by concentrating on the main job since only approximately 2 percent of the 1986 and 2003 samples reported having a second job.
-9 -included in the sample. Exclusion of these groups will lower inequality from what it would have been since a) those who are part-time workers tend to have lower wages; b) those who are out of the labor market, and hence do not report a wage, tend to be from the lower end of the wage distribution; and c) those who do not respond to the salary question are most likely at the upper tail of the distribution. Brainerd (1998) reports that in Russia, wages in the upper tail of the wage distribution may be underreported due to "innovative schemes" to evade taxes or 'under the table' or 'in the envelope' wage payments. 13 This is also likely to be the case in Ukraine.
We consider both demographic characteristics and job characteristics in our analysis. population, which we will discuss further below. Briefly, the demographic structure changed substantially with respect to age and education but not much in terms of nationality. The change in the structure of jobs -i.e., differences in the shares by activity of enterprise, location, and ownership type -reflect changes occurring in other transition countries. Most notably, the share of workers in agriculture and industry decreased, while the shares in service activities rose.
Among men, the sector with the greatest increase in jobs was in the transportation and -10 -telecommunication sector, while among women the greatest increase was in the education, health, and social protection. There was a shift in jobs toward the capital city of Kyiv by 2003, especially for women.
Changes in the Distribution of Wages and the Role of the Minimum Wage
To address the question of how much change there was in the male and female wage distributions from 1986 to 2003, we plot kernel density estimates of actual wages normalized to zero in each of the two years and calculate several measures of wage dispersion: standard deviation, Gini coefficient, Theil index, and three quantile measures (e.g. the 10-90 differential, or the difference between the 10 th and 90 th percentile of the log wage distribution). Each of the overall measures differs in its sensitivity to income variations at different points of the distribution. For example, for equi-distant transfers, the Theil measure is more sensitive to transfers at the top of the distribution while the Gini index is considered to be more sensitive to transfers around the mode.
In Figure 2 , we present the kernel density estimates of the log of real wages in 1986 and whereas the men's distribution changed from being narrowly peaked at the middle to being broader, and with more mass at the lower part of the distribution.
15
14 The selected halfwidth of the kernel, or the width of the density window around each point, is 0.09. 15 Our results differ from the findings of Brainerd (1998) for Russia during the early transition period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) in that she finds the changes for women were more equal throughout the distribution, with the bottom widening more than the top. The differences could be due to a number of reasons. It is -11 -
The truncation at the left of the distribution is notable in both panels of Figure What is especially notable is that: a) the density at these spikes for women is more than double that of men's in both years, and b) the spike near the minimum is much larger, for both men and women, in 2003 than in 1986. These findings indicate how much more important the minimum wage is for women and how much more important the minimum wage is in acting as a wage floor in 2003 than in 1986. The women's wage distribution especially collapses to the minimum wage in 2003.
16
As seen in Table 2 , the rise in overall wage inequality in Ukraine from 1986 to 2003 was significant. The standard deviations of wages (overall) rose by 10.2 percentage points and the Gini and Theil coefficients rose by 4.3 and 4.6 percentage points, respectively. According to our analysis, the Gini coefficients in Ukraine did not rise as much as the estimates for Russia from numerous sources (e.g., the UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database, WIID). Men's overall wage inequality is higher than women's in each year, but we cannot conclude that overall inequality rose more for men v. women, counter to recent studies of Poland (Keane and Prasad, 2005) and Russia (Brainerd, 1998) . We find different results among the six measures of inequality over this period in Ukraine. More precisely, changes in the standard deviations, the 10-90 and the 10-50 quantile measures indicate that men's inequality rose more than women's, possible that the minimum wage, which had deteriorated in this period, was not truncating the distribution in Russia. It may also be due to the fact that unlike our sample, hers is not restricted to full-time workers. 16 In 1986 the minimum wage is 58.8 percent of women's average wage and it rises to 70.5 percent in 2003.
-12 -but the reverse is true for the Theil and 50-90 measures. Men experienced a larger widening in the bottom half as compared to the top, whereas we find the opposite pattern for women: dispersion in the bottom half actually fell, while dispersion grew in the top half. Moreover, the growth in the top half of the distribution was much larger for women than for men.
Determinants of Changes in Inequality: Counterfactual and Decomposition Analysis

Methodology
To understand which factors within market forces are more important in accounting for the changes in men's and women's inequality, we use Lemieux's (2002) Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) , henceforth DFL, to develop a methodology that allows the construction of counterfactual wage distributions and their decomposition into three components:
1) labor force composition, i.e., the covariates (Xs), 2) the prices of human capital and job characteristics, i.e., regression coefficients (βs), and 3) residuals (µs).
We begin by constructing a counterfactual wage distribution that would prevail in period t =2003 if the distribution of observable worker characteristics were the same as in period s = 1986, based on DFL The method essentially modifies the classical kernel density estimator by attaching new sample weights, a it w , to each observation in the place of the original sample weights, w it, which are used to compute sample statistics representative of the population, where
w , we first estimate propensity scores with a logit model using pooled t and s period data from the ULMS. The propensity score is the probability that an individual in the pooled sample comes from the period s sample conditional on x:
The re-weighting factor Ψ i is then computed from the propensity scores as
The new sample weight is then computed as the product of the original sample weight and the reweighting factor:
We can express the counterfactual density of wages --the density that would have existed in
2003 if the distribution of characteristics of the workers had remained as in 1986 --as:
where y is a vector of wage, x is a vector of individual attributes and w a is the vector of weights.
We next focus on computing the distribution of the counterfactual wage, a it y that would prevail in period t if the 'price' or 'returns' to the characteristics were the same as in period s.
We first estimate separate OLS Mincerian wage regression (for men and women) for each period:
and then, following JMP, compute the counterfactual wage,
Lemieux ( We plot actual and counterfactual kernel densities estimates of the wages and compute several descriptive and counterfactual distributional statistics, as well as carry out the decomposition and reverse-order decomposition. The findings are described in the next section. While the kernel densities give us a sense of which factors are more important in driving the shapes in the male and female wage distributions, we can more precisely draw conclusions about their relative impact on changes in inequality from the decompositions of changes in the six measures of inequality. We present counterfactuals and decompositions of four measures of inequality in one order and then in reverse order for men and for women in Tables 3 and 4, 18 This is the distribution of y i03 weighted with
Findings
19 This is the distribution of a i y 03 weighted with w i .
-15 -respectively. 20 We find that both decompositions yield similar findings for men, however for women there are some discrepancies.
These results for men in Table 3 The results for women in Table 4 the most important factor in explaining the increase in equality. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of the residuals is very similar for men and women in both decompositions.
Identification of the Changes in the Xs and βs
We next try to understand which Xs and which βs are more important in the changes in inequality by looking more closely at the coefficients on the logit models used to estimate the propensity scores and the coefficients on the wage regressions used to construct alternative wages.
Shifts in the Labor Composition and the Minimum Wage
It is clear from the logit coefficients and marginal effects presented in Table 5 The descriptive statistics in Table 1 supplement our understanding of the relative changes in the composition for men v. women and help us understand why changes in the Xs ameliorated the increase in inequality for men throughout the distribution, but for women decreased it only in the lower half of the distribution, while increasing it in the top half of the distribution. An important factor in this phenomenon is the larger decline in employment (full-time only) among women (34.0 percent) than among men (19.5 percent) over this period. Moreover, whereas the logit results indicate that many of those who left employment were from the lower part of the wage distribution, Table 1 shows that the share of individuals with low wage characteristics fell more for women than for men, i.e., the share of women with less than high school education fell by 14.7 percentage points, while the decline for men was only 7.9 percentage points.
Conversely, the share of women with higher education rose by 9.2 percentage points, but for men, this share rose by only 4.2 percentage points.
-17 -Hence, the fact that more educated women represent a larger share in 2003 than in 1986 helps explain why the changes in characteristics worked to increase inequality for women in the upper half of the distribution. The large exit from the workforce of less-skilled women, combined with the binding minimum wage, help explain why inequality fell in the lower half of the distribution for women.
For men, it is also true that those with low wage demographic characteristics were also more likely to exit the labor force; however the declines in their employment were smaller than among low-wage women. The more important reason why inequality in the bottom half of the men's wage distribution grew more than women's is because the minimum wage was not as binding of a constraint for men as for women, since men's wages tended to be higher.
Changes in the Structure of Wages
The results of the human capital earnings regressions for each year for men and women are shown in Appendix Table A1 , but our principal interest is in the changes in these coefficients over time for men and for women, which are presented in Table 6 . The number of coefficients that change significantly over time, indicative of the degree to which the wage structure changed, is higher for women than men. For example, for women there was a significant change in the wage-age profile over time, while for men there is no change in the wage-age profile.
Changes in the returns to human capital do not appear to be an important factor explaining increasing inequality in Ukraine. Whereas the returns to higher education increased for both men and women in 2003, the 1986-2003 difference is only statistically significant for women in the secondary professional category. Our results are consistent with an earlier study by the World Bank (1996) of Ukraine's wage structure, which also finds that the earnings differentials by education remained very low in the transition, like in Soviet times. Moreover, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2004) have similar findings in their study using the same data set and other time periods. The lack of significance is striking given that the literature on changes in the returns to human capital in transition countries has consistently shown that a factor driving the increase in inequality was the more rapid increase in the returns to higher -18 -education (e.g. Jolliffe and Campos, 2005; Münich, Svejnar and Terrell, 2005b; Orazem and Vodopivec, 1997; and Rutowski, 1996) .
On the other hand, shifts in the inter-industry wage structure are significant for both men and women and are an important factor explaining inequality. The wage premium associated with jobs in any economic activity rose relative to wages in agriculture for both men and women. 22 This is consistent with the literature for transition economies (see e.g., Adamchik and Bedi, 2000) and with the finding by the World Bank (1996) for Ukraine. Newell (2001) concludes from his study of numerous transition economies that increasing inter-industry wage differentials are a principal cause of increases in wage inequality.
Conclusion
Recent methodological advances, namely the development of the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lemieux (2002) decomposition techniques, present new opportunities for analyzing the changes in the structure and dispersion of wages that were brought about by the major privatization, liberalization and other market-oriented reforms carried out in transition and other developing countries over the last two decades. In this paper, we provide the first application of the Lemieux (2002) decomposition in the context of the developing and transition economies. We examine changes in the distribution of wages in Ukraine and parse out the effects of markets and the institution of minimum wage.
Ukrainians have experienced a difficult transition to a market-oriented economy, with dramatic declines in GDP and hyperinflation in the 1990s and relatively rapid economic growth since then. In this respect, Ukraine's transition path is similar to that of Russia. Yet, wage inequality has risen much less than in Ukraine than in Russia, an outcome that we attribute to Ukraine's stronger commitment to the institution of the minimum wage and more gradual approach to introducing market forces during the transition.
-19 - Brainerd (2000; 1998) suggests that the significant widening of the lower half of the distribution in Russia and Ukraine as compared to other transition countries was due to the low and deteriorating minimum wage in these countries. We find that the minimum wage played an important role for women in both 1986 and 2003; although we recognize that its level fell substantially in real terms during the 1990s and may not have played a binding role at that time.
In general, we find that changes in the wage structure brought on by the new market system contributed to the increase in inequality for men (and perhaps for women), while changes in the composition of the work force moderated the increase in inequality (i.e., lowered it from what it would have been had the composition of the work force not changed). The exception is that changes in the composition of the women's labor force increased women's wage inequality in the upper half of the distribution, while it lowered it in the bottom half.
The changes in the values of the explanatory variables (Xs) and the estimated coefficients (βs) carry similar weight in the decomposition, with neither one being as important as the change in the unobservables. The question that arises is which changes in the composition and which changes in returns are more important? The changes in the βs that were most significant were those on the activities of enterprises as the changes on returns to human capital (age and education) were not significant for the most part. With respect to composition, we find large changes in the composition of skills and activities of enterprises: the shares of less educated and -20 -in agricultural and manufacturing activities fell significantly. The large exodus of low wage female workers is consistent with earlier findings by Hunt (2002) for Germany and Newell and
Socha (2005) for Poland. As concerns unobservables, we suspect that the privatization process and the minimum wage, neither of which we can capture in the counterfactuals, played an important part.
In concluding, we note that the changes in both the βs and Xs were greater for women than for men. Moreover, there was a larger exodus of women than men from the workforce over this period. If one considers the change in inequality as a proxy for the change in welfare, future research should take this exit from labor force into account -for instance by examining consumption in addition to income data. It is possible that employment, even at low wages, might provide higher utility to some individuals than being out of the labor force. From the standpoint of the Orange Revolution government and other governments looking for popular support, this would obviously be an important consideration. Finally, our results indicate that analysts and policymakers in the transition economies should take note of the effect of minimum wages on women. - (18%) - (15%) - (24%) - (1%) Residual ( 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Real Wages, 1989=100 1989 Wages, 1989=100 1990 Wages, 1989=100 1991 Wages, 1989=100 1992 Wages, 1989=100 1993 Wages, 1989=100 1994 Wages, 1989=100 1995 Wages, 1989=100 1996 Wages, 1989=100 1997 Wages, 1989=100 1998 Wages, 1989=100 1999 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Supposed to be Paid Actually Received
